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1 Introduction
It has become trivial to point out how decision-making processes in various social, political and
economical sphere are assisted by automated systems. Improved efficiency, the hallmark of these
systems, drives the mass scale integration of automated systems into daily life. However, as a robust
body of research in the area of algorithmic injustice shows [16, 2, 6, 4], algorithmic tools embed
and perpetuate societal and historical biases and injustice. In particular, a persistent recurring trend
within the literature indicates that society’s most vulnerable are disproportionally impacted. When
algorithmic injustice and bias is brought to the fore, most of the solutions on offer 1) revolve around
technical solutions and 2) do not focus centre disproportionally impacted groups. This paper zooms
out and draws the bigger picture. It 1) argues that concerns surrounding algorithmic decision making
and algorithmic injustice require fundamental rethinking above and beyond technical solutions, and
2) outlines a way forward in a manner that centres vulnerable groups through the lens of relational
ethics.
2 The Problem
Devices that proliferate public and private space (e.g., phones, cameras, IoT sensors), produce mass
flow of data that are fed into machine learning systems. Dynamic, pattern-based abstractions pro-
vide these machine learning systems with actionable indices of “who we are” and “how we might
behave” [20, 7]. When these machine learning systems that infer and predict individual behaviour
and action, based on superficial extrapolations, are deployed into the social world, various unin-
tended problems arise. These systems ‘pick up’ social and historical stereotypes rather than any
deep fundamental causal explanations. In the process, individuals and groups, often at the margins
of society that fail to fit stereotypical boxes, suffer the undesirable consequences. Various findings il-
lustrates this: bias in detecting skin tones in pedestrians [19]; bias in predictive policing systems [17];
gender bias and discrimination in the display of STEM career ads [14]; racial bias in recidivism al-
gorithms [3]; bias in the politics of search engines [13]; bias and discrimination in medicine [9]; and
bias in hiring [1], to mention but a few. As algorithmic decision-making is deployed across the so-
cial sphere in socially contested contexts such as “acceptable” behaviour, “ill” health, and “normal”
body type, algorithms make decisions with moral implications, not just value-free categorization
tasks, for instance. Despite this fact, their operations are seen as technical which is often taken to
be “value-free” and “a-moral” [15]. Unfair and discriminatory outcomes, as a result, are treated
as side-effects that have technical solutions rather than problems with fundamentally deep-rooted
underlying assumptions. Research in algorithmic fairness almost exclusively focuses on technical
“implementable” solutions. Although these solutions are necessary, they can be superficial, hiding
bias (not removing it) at best, and thus giving the illusion that the problem has been solved [11].
3 Motivation and Contribution
The first move towards Relational ethics is an acknowledgement that when we are dealing with
data (especially those that measure, classify, and/or analyse the social, cultural, and political realm),
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we are necessarily dealing with human culture, value, and meaning. Consequently, any tool we cre-
ate and deploy are intimately tied with the nature of being and morality – questions that necessarily
require us to look beyond “purely technical solutions”. Relational perspectives [8, 12] encourage us
to pull the rug from under and examine fundamental questions and unstated assumptions. To this
end, this paper proposes to go beyond “technical solutions” and emphasizes the need for critical
examination of deeply rooted, unexamined assumptions. It explores deeper philosophical questions
that need to be addressed as part of developing and deploying ethical algorithmic systems. These
include the need to treat terms such as “bias”, “justice”, “fairness”, and “ethics” as dynamic, mov-
ing, and contingent concepts that never emerge in a social and political vacuum, which consequently
require more than technical and methodological solutions.
4 Towards a Relational Ethics
4.1 Centering the disproportionally impacted
For any individual person, group, or situation, algorithmic classifications and predictions give an
advantage or they give suffering. Certain patterns are made visible and objectified while other types
are erased. Some identities (and not others) are recognised as a pedestrian, or fit for a STEM career,
or in need of medical care. Some are identified as criminal while others are ignored by algorithmic
machines altogether. The central recurring theme in algorithmic injustice literature remains that
individuals and groups that are at the margin of society are disproportionally impacted. Relational
ethics asks that for any solution that we seek, the starting point be the individuals and groups that are
impacted the most. This means we seek to centre those disproportionally impacted and not solutions
that benefit the majority.
4.2 Prioritization of understanding over prediction
Much work within developing or implementing algorithmic systems is focused on maximizing pre-
diction and accuracy with very little effort, if any at all, going towards investigating deeper under-
standings. Within prison systems, for example, the focus is on finding patterns on criminal activities
with the aim of developing systems that predict future crimes. Relational ethics emphasizes that
we shift the focus towards gaining deeper contextual understandings prior to developing predictive
models. In the case of the prison system, for example, we ask why we find the patterns that we do,
which in turn calls for contextual and historical antecedents, instead of using our findings as inputs
towards predictive systems.
4.3 Algorithms as more than tools that create and sustains certain social order
The persistent perception of algorithmic tools as merely a method rather than a way of defining, clas-
sifying, and organizing the person and furthermore the social world, contributes to why “technical
solutions” to algorithmic bias and unfairness seem logical. Classification, categorization, and pat-
tern recognition are assumed to be technical and methodological problems that we need to “solve”
rather than practices that create certain social order [5]. In reality, algorithmic classifications, pre-
dictions, and standards that seem ordinarily invisible in our daily lives, create and sustain the social
and moral order. The use of hiring and policing algorithms, for example, requires the simplifica-
tion of contested and complex terms such as “successful” and “criminality”. Such seemingly banal
tasks carry grave consequences for certain individuals and groups, and subsequently reconfiguring
socially acceptable norms [10]. Relational ethics encourages us to view the task of developing and
deploying algorithmic tools as part of the practice of creating and reinforcing certain types of norms
and social order.
4.4 Bias, fairness, and justice are moving targets
Neither people, nor the environment, are static; what society deems fair and ethical changes over
time. The concept of fairness and ethical practice is, therefore, a moving target and not something
that can have a final answer or can be “solved” once and for all. It is possible that what is consid-
ered ethical currently and within certain domains for certain societies will not be received similarly
at a different time, in another domain, or for a different society [18]. Adopting relational ethics
means that we view our understandings, proposed solutions, and definitions of “bias”, “fairness”
2
and “ethics” as partially-open. This partial openness allows for revision and reiteration in accor-
dance with the dynamic development of such challenges.
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